How is postmodernism an ally of legal pluralism?

Origins: the Conference on Critical Legal Studies (1977, Madison — from a Harvard-centered circle) — a radical convergence of realist skepticism, Marxist social theory and the 1960s movements; its founding generation: Duncan Kennedy, Roberto Unger, Morton Horwitz — "Crits" who took aim at their own law schools. The core claims (the indeterminacy-politics pair): Law is politics. Legal reasoning is not a neutral science but a continuation of political struggle by technical means — doctrine is a weapon, not a mirror of justice. Indeterminacy. Legal materials (rules, precedents, principles) do not determine outcomes; for every authority there is a counter-authority — clever advocacy can argue both sides, so the judge's choice, not the doctrine, decides. Hence "the rule is… whatever the judge had for breakfast" (the realist quip radicalised). The legitimating function. Law's claim to neutrality is itself the ideology: it presents the arrangements of the powerful (property, contract hierarchy) as natural, objective, inevitable — legal consciousness trained in law schools internalises it ("trashing" the curriculum's hidden politics was the Crits' pedagogy). Anti-formalism + contradiction: law's central ideals (liberty vs equality; individualism vs altruism — Kennedy's pairing) are permanently at war inside doctrine itself; law is contradictory all the way down. Neighbours and descendants: critical legal history (Horwitz: doctrine tracks power, not logic); Critical Race Theory (Bell, Crenshaw, Delgado — law…