6.2 The Convention on Compensation for Damage to Third Parties,

Resulting from Acts of Unlawful Interference Involving Aircraft (2009) The problem (the terrorism's surface victims): the unlawful interference — the hijacking- turned-crash, the sabotage, the attack-on-the-airport — the third parties' catastrophic damage: the 9/11's ground victims' lesson (the massive surface harm beyond the passengers' regime). The 2009 Convention's regime (the modern attempt): The liable persons' channel: the operator's-and-the-perpetrators' layered liability — the operator's strict-but-capped liability (the first-tier recovery: the victims' quick compensation) + the perpetrators'-and-conspirators' unlimited liability (the wrongdoers' full exposure) + the state's supplementary faces (the territorial state's second-tier responsibility where the first tiers are exhausted — the collective-guarantee idea); The compensation fund's concept: the contributions-based fund (the aviation-and- insurance industry's pooled contributions — the risk's socialisation: the unlimited-catastrophe's insurability problem answered by the pooling); The damage's scope: the death, the injury, the property's loss from the unlawful-interference acts (the convention's defined family); The jurisdiction-and-claims' machinery: the damage's-place courts; the standing- committee's administration (the fund's governance). The 2009 Convention's fate (the honest note): the not-yet-in-force status (the ratification's slow accumulation — the insurance market's post-9/11 state-backed-pools practice filling the gap meanwhile: the conventional regime and the market reality's race). The two conventions' pairing (the unit's frame): the ordinary-risk regime (the Rome 1952: the accident's victims — the strict- but-capped operator's liability) vs. the unlawful-interference regime (the 2009: the terror's…