Discuss (b) ut res magis valeat quam pereat

2.1.1 The Literal Rule (the plain-meaning rule): the statute's words construed in their ordinary, natural, grammatical sense — the plain meaning followed whatever the consequences (the intention presumed in the words themselves); the rationale: the judicial restraint (the legislature's words, not the judge's notions — the separation's discipline); the consequences-followed classics (the result even if "absurd" in the critic's eye — the literal school's honesty); the critique: the absurdity-and-injustice risk (the rule's rigidity) → the golden rule's corrective. 2.1.2 The Golden Rule (the modification craft): the literal sense first; BUT where the literal reading yields absurdity or repugnance or inconsistency with the rest, the modification — the words read so as to avoid the absurdity (the "golden" escape: Grey v. Pearson's classic formulation — the grammatical sense unless inconsistency-or-absurdity); the two levels (the mild modification — the sense's adjustment; the strong form — the reading's departure (the "absurdity" high threshold)); the critique: the absurdity's subjectivity (the judge's escape-hatch — the discretion's entry). 2.1.3 The Mischief Rule (the purposive ancestor — Heydon's Case 1584): the four questions' craft: (1) what was the common law before the Act? (2) what was the mischief and defect the common law did not remedy? (3) what remedy did the legislature resolve-and-appoint? (4) the true reason of the remedy? — then the interpreter's office: the suppression…