6.8 Presumption against Intending What is Inconvenient or

Unreasonable The presumption: the legislature not presumed to intend the inconvenient-or-unreasonable — the practical-and-workable construction preferred (the administration's feasibility; the citizens' reasonableness); the craft: the consequences' assessment (the construction's practical-results compared — the better-practicality's selection); the applications: the regulatory schemes' workable reading (the impossible-or-burdensome interpretations' rejection); the bureaucratic feasibility (the machinery's operable construction); the limits: the policy's clear-command acceptance (the court's convenience not the legislature's override). The presumptions' synthesis (the exam's craft): the presumptions as the interpretive DEFAULTS (the rebuttable starting-points — the clear-words' rebuttal); the presumptions' family- tree (the legislative-rationality presumptions (6.6-6.8) + the legal-continuity presumptions (6.1-6.4) + the international-and-constitutional-respect presumptions (6.2, 6.5)); the presumptions' discipline (the policy-favouring readings' restraint — the judicial-interpretation's balance). Exam Focus Long questions (the unit is the presumptions' bank): (i) Any four presumptions (each: the presumption + the rationale + the application); (ii) The retrospectivity presumption (the full craft — the vested rights'-and-procedural nuances); (iii) The constitutionality presumption + the jurisdiction presumption (the judicial-power pair). Short questions: the vested rights; the declaratory statute; the ex turpi cousin; the treaty-consistent reading. Trick areas: (i) The presumptions are REBUTTABLE (the clear words prevail) — the "presumption as bar" error; (ii) The PROCEDURAL statutes apply immediately to the pending cases (the substance-procedure distinction) — the "no retrospectivity ever" overstatement; (iii) The presumption of constitutionality belongs to the…